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ABSTRACT ▪ Direct involvement methods are often seen as heralding a new
industrial relations in which employee voice is weaker than in systems based
on unions or works councils. We test this argument through an empirical
study across the European operations of 25 multinationals with headquarters
in the UK and find that this is true only when direct voice is used in isolation.
Such systems are not uncommon, but more often direct voice coexists with
union and other representative channels. It is the variability in the relationship
between three channels (direct, representative committee and union) that is
significant. This confirms that institutions matter, but we conclude that the
subject of industrial relations needs to focus more on the interplay between
different voice mechanisms.
Introduction
Direct communication and information-sharing in strategic issues are
hallmarks of the ‘transformed’ industrial relations proclaimed by Kochan
et al. (1986). In the USA such innovations in personnel management have
long been seen as a potential substitute for a union-based system
(Foulkes, 1980). In a similar vein, in the UK direct communication is part
of the vision of the end of institutions that Purcell (1995) portrayed in
the early 1990s. In such scenarios, management, rather than the state or
unions, are pivotal actors in the creation of industrial relations systems.
Moreover, management has used this enhanced power to develop a new
style of human resource management — high-commitment management
— in which direct communication has a central role.
For some, this requires a fundamental reorientation of the subject of
industrial relations so that non-union methods come to the fore
(Kaufman, 2001). At the other extreme is a defensive reaction, which
stresses the continued importance of collective bargaining and the state
in moulding industrial relations. Behind both are probably normative
European Journal of Industrial Relations
© 2005 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
Volume 11 Number 1 pp 27–50 www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/0959680105050399
03 wood (ds)  21/1/05  10:28 am  Page 27
judgements about the value and effects of unionism; certainly underlying
the defensive reaction is a belief in the value of independent worker
representation and fear that employee voice is reduced or even becomes
a sham under direct regimes.
However, it is increasingly clear that direct communication is not
necessarily at the expense of unions or other forms of collective voice.
Indeed, the core of the mutual gains model (Kochan and Osterman, 1994)
is that unions can exist alongside other institutions; through these, and
their own enhanced involvement in production and strategic decisions,
employee voice will increase. Even without a significant extension in the
union role, employees will gain through having a direct voice in the areas
traditionally outside the union’s remit.
The most detailed information from within Europe comes from
Britain. Analysis of the Workplace Employee Relations Survey series
confirms that direct communication, and other elements of high-
commitment management, are not more common in non-unionized
workplaces (Machin and Wood, 2005; de Menezes and Wood, 2005). By
1998, as many as 78 per cent of unionized British workplaces had
multiple channels (Bryson et al., 2004: 138). However, there has been a
parallel decline in collective voice and thus an increase in workplaces with
no voice arrangements — though this trend has been partially counter-
acted by EU regulation, notably the European Works Council Directive
and the Framework Directive on Information and Consultation.
These developments highlight the need for greater attention to the
variability in four relations. The first is that between the three channels
of employee voice at the workplace: unions, works councils and other
representative committees, and direct methods. Second is the variability
in overall level of voice in workplaces, which is likely to reflect the
differing combinations of voice mechanisms. Third is the relationship
between unionization and the human resource methods, including high-
commitment management. Fourth is the variation in managerial
autonomy across different national institutional settings. In a separate
article we deal with the fourth relationship, the extent to which manage-
ment’s autonomy from both the state and representative influences
affects the different ways in which direct and representative methods are
combined in workplaces. In the present article we report on a study that
examines the use of multiple channels and assesses the extent of both
voice and high-commitment management attached to different configur-
ations. We open with an outline of the conceptual background to the
study and the hypotheses that we are testing. We then describe the data
set, the measures and analysis procedure, before presenting the results
and conclusions.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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Theoretical Background
The Nature of Enterprise Employee Voice Systems
The starting point of our study is the conception of employee voice as a
continuum from information-sharing to joint decision-making (co-
determination or collective bargaining) with consultation lying between
them. The standard conception of industrial relations systems is that
there is a correspondence between particular channels and each stage of
voice. Thus, direct methods are associated with information sharing,
works councils with consultation and union channels with bargaining.
We will thus first test this initial assumption, which may be summarized
in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: The use of the direct channel of voice will be
predominately for information sharing.
Hypothesis 1b: The use of representative committees will be
predominately for consultation.
Hypothesis 1c: The use of the trade union channel will be predominately
for negotiation.
If the above hypotheses hold, the level of voice for each channel will be
independent of that for other channels. In conventional industrial
relations, this assumption is combined with the assumption that one
channel dominates, so that all issues, at least in which employees have a
voice, are dealt with in the same way. For example, in the Anglo-Saxon
econometric literature enterprises or workplaces are widely treated as
either union or non-union. In similar vein, national systems have been
characterized by whether or not they are predominantly union-based; in
consequence, as the salience of unionism has declined, there has been
uncertainty as to the nature of such systems (e.g. Kochan et al., 1986;
Millward, 1994). Where multiple-channel use has been acknowledged,
most predominantly in the portrayal of Germany as having a dual system,
the emphasis has been on the divide between bargaining at industry
(extra-enterprise) level and consultation at enterprise level, rather than on
multiple channels within the enterprise.
Nonetheless, there is increasing recognition that multiple channels
may be the norm, at least within Europe. National systems might then
be better characterized by the propensity of organizations to use
multiple methods, and more specifically by the dominant combinations
of channels. Alternatively, the variety of principles underlying organiz-
ational practice could be so large that no one type predominates. If this
is not the case, multiple-channel systems can be of two types. In the first,
the same issue is handled through more than one channel: either
different dimensions of an issue are dealt with through different
Wood & Fenton-O’Creevy: Direct Involvement and Employee Voice
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channels, or one channel is used for disclosing information about an
issue while another is used for consultation or bargaining over it. In the
second type of system, the channel used varies with the issue: an
organization might bargain over wages or the terms of redundancies,
consult over working practices and simply share information on
strategic questions. If management has become increasingly the main
architect of enterprise industrial relations, we might expect this second
alternative to come to the fore.
The Level of Voice
If our first set of hypotheses, which link channels to levels of voice, is
supported, workplaces that only have direct channels will have a lower
level of overall voice. Conversely, the union channel will produce higher
levels of voice, the highest being the ‘predictive bargaining’ described by
McCarthy and Ellis (1974: 102–6) 30 years ago, which extends to the
organization’s overall strategic planning. In practice, the picture may not
be so straightforward.
First, each of the three channels can entail any of the three levels of
involvement. In the UK, for example, information dissemination and
consultation over business and employment matters can take place
through union channels, while a union presence may not automatically
result in collective bargaining (Brown et al., 1998; Commission on the
Future of Worker–Management Relations, 1994). The possibility of
bargaining through a works council has long been recognized in the
literature on Germany and The Netherlands (Van Ruysseveldt and
Visser, 1996: 255; Visser and Van Ruysseveldt 1996: 152). Less often
acknowledged is the possibility that direct methods may entail bargain-
ing or joint decision-making (see especially the Australian case in
Morehead et al., 1997: 180–204). For example when Nissan (UK)
experienced falling demand in 1993, it consulted its employees before
deciding how to deal with the surplus labour problem (Wickens, 1995:
136–7).
Second, the union channel may be associated with a significant
number of issues on which employees are not involved. For example,
as collective bargaining is a cat-and-mouse game and information is a
source of power, both parties will be reluctant to share information.
Some union-based systems have been founded on a clear demarcation
between matters open to negotiation and those subject to managerial
prerogative, restricting union participation to operational rather than
strategic matters, an effect that may have been reinforced in the past
by unions’ suspicion of involvement in strategic issues. We summarize
this argument in the following hypothesis, which we will subsequently
test:
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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Hypothesis 2: The trade union voice channel will be used for significantly
fewer issues than either representative committee or direct channels.
Third, even where either the direct method or the representative commit-
tee predominates, the presence of a union in the workplace or at industry
level may encourage increased voice through these channels. This seems
especially plausible where there are links between works councils (or
other consultative bodies) and trade unions. Conversely, autonomy from
union influence may reduce the number of issues over which manage-
ment involves employees. Thus we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Autonomy from union influence is associated with a lower
number of issues over which management involves employees and lower
level of voice regardless of channels.
Fourth, our arguments so far do not predict any particular combinations
of channels to be associated with higher overall levels of involvement; but
sole reliance on the direct channel might be expected to result in lower
overall levels, since direct communication with employees rarely involves
more than the provision of information. Although this seems likely if
direct channels are associated mainly with information sharing, it is not
inevitable, since they can be used for higher levels of voice and the union
channel may be used for significantly fewer issues. We thus test the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Sole reliance on direct channels will result in lower levels of
overall employee involvement compared with the use of representative
channels (alone or in combination with the direct channel).
Likewise, we would hypothesize that sole reliance on direct channels will
result in a greater use of high-commitment practices, which in the Anglo-
Saxon debate has been treated as a criterion in defining industrial
relations transformation. High-commitment management is taken to
include functional flexibility, teamworking, minimal status differences,
systematic appraisals, contingent pay and employee involvement in
suggesting productivity- or quality-enhancing innovations (Wood,
1996a; Wood and Albanese, 1995). The limited research thus far has
focused on the relationship between unionism and high-commitment
management, and has concentrated on the USA and the UK. The results
in the UK have tended to show that the use of high-commitment manage-
ment practices, like direct voice, are not related to unionism; while in the
USA the evidence is mixed. For these reasons we do not expect direct
voice to be universally related to high-commitment practices unless it is
the only source of employee voice. We thus hypothesise:
Hypothesis 5: A sole reliance on direct channels will be associated with
higher use of high-commitment management practices.
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We now test these hypotheses. We first introduce the data set, measures
and analysis procedures used in the study.
The Study
To test these hypotheses we required data from a set of organizations
where there was likely to be both considerable variation in the use of
voice mechanisms and in which the full use of all three types of channels
was not rare. We also wanted to be able to test for the effect of union
influence independent of the level of union voice in the workplaces,
which suggested a sample in which industry-wide bargaining was still
important. Since the research was part of a wider project concerned with
the effects of variability in management autonomy on employee voice
and high-commitment practices, it had to be cross-national.
Our study examined the European operations of a sample of UK-
headquartered multinationals. By focusing on companies based in a single
country we could hold constant any home-country effect. Conducting
such a study in Europe is particularly appropriate, since there are still
major differences between EU states in the extent to which information
and consultation practices between enterprises and their employees are
legally mandated. The UK has little such legislation compared, for
example, with France and Germany (two countries in which UK invest-
ment has been high).1 We concentrated on UK-based multinationals
because of ease of access and resource constraints. The data were acquired
from member companies of the European Study Group, a not-for-profit
association of companies (the majority in the Financial Times Top 100)
formed to exchange ideas on developments connected to transnational
employment legislation.
For data collection a senior management informant at company head-
quarters first completed a short questionnaire covering company struc-
ture and human resource strategy. Second, management was asked to
send a larger questionnaire to the separate country operations within the
EU for each of the main business streams, the details of which had been
identified in the first questionnaire. Where the MNC was a conglomer-
ate with highly diverse operations, we focused on one major stream of
business. We encouraged companies to complete questionnaires even for
countries with few employees; but if managers were reluctant to do so
they were asked to focus on their UK, French and German operations.
This second questionnaire concentrated on personnel practices, in
particular employee voice mechanisms, as well as practices that are
commonly associated with high-commitment management, in particular
teamworking, appraisal systems, performance-related pay and the
harmonization of terms and conditions.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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The validity of the data could be verified in two ways. First, we
conducted interviews at company headquarters following the completion
of the first questionnaire. These focused on the typical ways of working in
the firm, and we compared this information with the responses to the ques-
tionnaire sent to the country operations in stage two of the data collection.
Second, we conducted interviews with a range of actors, including trade
union and works council representatives, in matched pairs of British and
continental European establishments in two of the firms. Neither compari-
son revealed any substantial differences between the information acquired
in the questionnaires and that from the interviews. These exercises also
confirmed that managers could readily distinguish between informing,
consulting and negotiating with employees or their representatives.
In all, 25 companies participated in the study (a response rate of 56 per
cent), with data collected for 111 operations in 15 countries. Of these, 33
were in the UK and another 53 in France, Germany, The Netherlands and
Spain; these five countries account for 78 per cent of the total. Because of
incomplete data, N is smaller in some of the tables which follow.
The Measures
The study focused on issues and channels of employee voice. It covered a
range of 15 strategic and operational issues. These were: (1) the financial
situation of the organization; (2) future development of the business; (3)
changes to company structure; (4) major new investments mergers/acqui-
sitions; (5) transfers of production; (6) cutbacks to or closures of estab-
lishments; (7) employment levels; (8) collective redundancies; (9)
improving productivity/competitiveness; (10) individual dismissals; (11)
pay; (12) employee benefits; (13) new working methods/production
processes/technology; and (14) health and safety. The channels through
which issues may be handled were, in the terminology of the question-
naire, via union, representative committee (e.g. works council) and direct
communication (e.g. team-briefing, town hall meeting).
The level of employee voice was measured in terms of four categories:
(1) ‘not formally informed or consulted’; (2) ‘informed’; (3) ‘consulted’;
and (4) ‘negotiation/joint decision-making’. The mean level was calcu-
lated for the 15 issues and for each channel. First we calculated a channel-
independent employee voice level for each issue, as the maximum across
all three channels on each issue for each workplace. We then took the
mean across all 15 issues.
We assessed management autonomy from unions by asking respon-
dents to specify the extent to which a trade union was able to influence
decisions. This was scored on a five-point scale from ‘no influence’ to
‘very great influence’. The scale was reversed to give a measure of
autonomy from unions.
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High-commitment practices were calculated by asking respondents
whether the following practices were used:
• Teamworking (measured by asking ‘which of the following statements
apply to the way that teamworking operates at this workplace?’): (1)
there is no teamworking; (2) teamworking depends on team members
working interdependently; (3) team members are able to appoint their
own team leaders; (4) teams are self-managing.
• Quality circles (‘do you have workplace “quality circles” or “continu-
ous improvement teams”, i.e. groups set up to discuss aspects of
performance or solve specific problems?; if yes, what proportion of
employees have been involved in these groups in the last 12 months?’)
(seven-point scale: 1 = none to 7 = all).
• Harmonized terms and conditions (‘do you have harmonized terms
and conditions of employment?’): (1) terms and conditions vary by
employee group; (2) all non-managerial employees have the same
terms and conditions; (3) managers and all employees have the same
terms and conditions.
• Single status (‘do you have a policy of “single status” [equal access to
facilities and fringe benefits] for all employees?’): (1) no; (2) yes.
• Appraisal (proportion of non-managerial employees subject to a
formal performance review process).
• Performance-related pay (proportion of non-managerial employees
whose pay is partly determined by their performance).
To assess the relationship between high-commitment management vari-
ables we conducted a factor analysis of the practices. Table 1 shows the
rotated factor-loading matrix. Factor 1 concerns the use of formal
appraisal processes and performance-related pay for non-managerial
employees. Factor 2 concerns the use of harmonized terms and
conditions and single status. Factor 3 concerns the use of quality circles
and the level of teamworking.
Analysis Procedures
We used a variety of methods depending on the hypothesis being tested.
For hypothesis 1, we examined the number of issues covered at each level
of involvement for each channel. We used ANOVA to compare the mean
number of issues at each level across the different channels.
In order to investigate the nature of voice systems, we first used an
exploratory factor analysis, then cluster analysis and finally correlation
analysis. The factor analysis was used to examine the structure of the
voice data, in particular to assess the extent to which the level of voice is
linked to channels (a linkage that we earlier associated with the traditional
industrial relations model) or to issues. If we can fit a three-factor model
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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in which each factor loads on one of the three channels, this would imply
that enterprises have a separate approach to voice for each channel. That
is, the level of voice is related across all issues for each particular channel.
In contrast, the factors might reflect particular combinations of issues.
For example, we might find that the level of voice for the more strategic
issues, for example the future development of the business, tends to be
related, but that the level differs from that for the more traditional oper-
ational issues such as pay and employee benefits; in which case a two-
factor model would fit the data. Or even a single-factor model might
emerge, which would imply that there is a tendency for the level of voice
to vary proportionately across all issues and channels. Finally, it may be
the case that no factor model fits the data or that the fitted model is not
readily interpretable. In this case we would conclude that the employee-
voice practices of UK multinationals are idiosyncratic.
We would expect any multiple use of channels would reflect whichever
of channels or issues emerged from the factor analysis as the ordering
principle (assuming one does). The cluster analysis was then used, on the
basis of the dimensions that emerged in the factor analysis, to see if clear
clusters of businesses could be identified using this ordering principle:
Wood & Fenton-O’Creevy: Direct Involvement and Employee Voice
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TABLE 1. High-Commitment Management Variables: Rotated Factor
Loadings
Factor
1 2 3
Proportion of non-managerial employees 
covered by formal performance appraisal 
scheme. 0.858 0.107 0.136
Proportion of non-managerial employees 
whose pay is partly determined by their 
performance. 0.852 –0.144
Harmonized terms and conditions of 
employment? –0.143 0.850 –0.134
Single status for all employees? 0.311 0.756 0.189
Level of teamworking (1 = none, 2 = work 
interdependently, 3 = involved in hiring 
team members, 4 = self managing). 0.132 –0.151 0.776
Proportion of workforce in quality circles 
or continuous improvement teams? 0.132 –0.151 0.776
Notes: Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: varimax
with Kaiser normalization. Variance explained = 69%. N = 108.
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that is, whether clusters of businesses could be discerned that reflect a
common approach to their use of employee voice and more specifically
their use of channels or their mode of handling issues, depending on
which was found to be dominant in the data from the factor analysis.
Finally, correlation analysis was used to assess whether multiple
channels were used in enterprises in combination or as substitutes, i.e.
whether they reflect the use of different channels for different issues or
whether they reflect the use of multiple channels in combination for each
issue.
We tested hypothesis 2 by comparing the mean number of issues on
which management involves the workforce via each of the three channels.
We approached hypothesis 3 by assessing the correlation between
autonomy from union influence and the number of issues that were
handled through the three channels. For hypothesis 4 we examined
whether the mean number of issues for each of the three levels of voice
was lower for those enterprises that rely solely on direct methods.
Finally, we assessed, again through ANOVA, the relationship between
the three high-commitment management factors and cluster membership
to test hypothesis 5 that their level will be higher in direct-only enter-
prises
Results
Testing Hypothesis 1: Certain Channels Are Associated with
Particular Levels of Voice
In order to assess the stereotypes ‘union equals negotiation’, ‘representa-
tive committee equals consultation’ and ‘direct communication equals
information’, we first examined the usage of each channel in the work-
places across the 15 issues that our survey addressed. Table 2 shows the
average number of issues per enterprise on which management used each
channel to inform, consult or negotiate with the workforce. The union
channel was used for information-sharing purposes for 6.7 issues, the
representative committee for 12.1 and direct communication for 11.5. The
union channel is used on average for negotiation over 2.4 issues, compared
with 1.6 in the case of representative channels and 1.4 in direct channels.
ANOVA tests confirm that the higher use of the union channel for
negotiation is statistically significant compared to both the consultative
and direct channels, while the lower use of the union channel for infor-
mation sharing is also significantly different from the use of these other
channels. ANOVA tests also reveal that the representative channel is used
for consultation to a greater extent than either the union or direct
channel.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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When the union channel is used for negotiating, joint decision-making
or consultation, it concerns mostly a small set of the more traditional
issues of pay, benefits and redundancies, and cutbacks or closures. By
contrast, representative committees are used for information across the
full range of issues in most enterprises, with the exception of individual
dismissals. More detailed analysis suggests that the consultation and joint
decision-making through the representative committee channel is
focused mostly on collective redundancies, health and safety issues,
closures and employee benefits, but in a minority of enterprises it is also
used for benefits. The direct channel is used by most enterprises almost
exclusively for information. However, a significant minority of enter-
prises engages in direct consultation or joint decision-making with
employees, principally on new working methods, improving produc-
tivity/competitiveness and health and safety issues.
The results offer some support for hypothesis 1. The union channel
shows the greatest use of negotiation and joint decision-making, the
representative committee channel shows the greatest use of consultation
and the direct channel is used predominately for information. However,
all three channels are used to some extent for each level of voice. The
stereotype does not hold in a significant minority of enterprises.
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TABLE 2. Mean Number of Issues Covered at Each Level of Involvement via
Each Channel
Channel
Union Representative Direct
(base: enterprises committee (base: enterprises
which use this (base: enterprises which use this 
channel) which use this channel)
channel)
Level of involvementa Mean number of issues (out of 15) covered at each level
None 8.3* 2.9 3.5
Information 6.7* 12.1 11.5
Consultation 4.6** 6.0 2.02
Negotiation/joint 
decision-making 2.4* 1.6 1.4
N 48 80 87
Notes: a Joint decision-making is assumed to include consultation and information,
and consultation is assumed to include information.
*Differences between channels are significant at p < 0.05 for union versus
representative committee and direct.
**Differences between channels are significant at p < 0.05 for direct and union versus
representative committee.
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Examining the Nature of Voice Systems: Factor Analysis of the
Level of Voice for Issues and Each Channel
A factor analysis (principal component analysis and varimax rotation) of
the data on employee voice produced three discrete factors that corre-
spond to the three channels of voice. The three factors accounted for 56.4
per cent of the total variance..Table 3 shows the results: factor 1 shows
that there is a strong correlation between the levels of voice on each issue
through the union channel; factor 2 shows the same for the representa-
tive committee, and factor 3 shows the same for direct communication.
The channel rather than the issue explains variability in the level of voice
for an issue, and across the total sample the level of voice through each
channel is independent of the level of voice through the other channels.
The factor analysis suggests that employee voice systems are differenti-
ated by the combinations of channels that they use and not by their
differential treatment of issues.
Cluster Analysis of Approach to Employee Involvement
Based on the three factors, we attempted to identify the predominant
systems of employee voice on the basis of predominant combinations of
channels. We identified five distinct clusters,2 two pure types and three
hybrids. The pure types are: direct voice in which the direct channel
predominates (‘direct voice-only’) and representative voice in which the
representative committee/works council predominates (‘representa-
tive’). The hybrid forms are: union-based in which the union predomi-
nates but some use is made of representative committees (‘union-based’),
direct and representative voice in which both methods are used equally
but no use is made of union channels (‘direct/representative’), and multi-
channel voice in which all three channels are used together (‘multi-
channel’). Table 4 shows the mean level of voice by channel for each
cluster.
Of the five clusters, the most frequently used in our sample is the
direct/representative system (33 per cent), followed closely by direct
voice-only (32 per cent). The multi-channel grouping accounted for 11
per cent and the representative for 21 per cent. The least used is union-
based (4 per cent). Whether this is seen as a hybrid — as types 4 and 5
clearly are — or as an approximation to the pure union-based system is
of less importance than the fact that in no organization is the union
channel the monopolizing voice.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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TABLE 3. Factor Analysis of Employee Involvement Items
Rotated Component Matrix
Extent to which employees or their Component
representatives are informed or 
consulted about 1 2 3
Major new investments, via union 0.848
New working methods/production processes/
technology, via union 0.845
Changes to company structure, via union 0.843 0.114
Health and safety, via union 0.831
Transfers of production, via union 0.822 0.117
Future development of the business, via union 0.818
Cutbacks to/closures of undertakings/
establishments, via union 0.817
Employment levels in the company, via union 0.795 0.125
Improving productivity/competitiveness, via 
union 0.776
Mergers/acquisitions, via union 0.763
Financial situation of organisation, via union 0.744
Employee benefits, via union 0.721
Collective redundancies, via union 0.720 0.105
Pay issues, via union 0.648
Individual dismissals, via union 0.626
Cutbacks to/closures of undertakings, via 
representative committee 0.864
Collective redundancies, via representative 
committee 0.853
Changes to company structure, via 
representative committee 0.100 0.847 –0.112
Transfers of production, via representative 
committee 0.830
Major new investments, via representative 
committee 0.793 –0.119
Future development of the business, via 
representative committee 0.163 0.780 –0.103
New working methods, via representative 
committee 0.778 –0.111
Financial situation of organisation, via 
representative committee 0.768 0.114
Mergers/acquisitions, via representative 
committee 0.765
Improving productivity/competitiveness, via 
representative committee 0.152 0.754
Employment levels in the company, via 
representative committee 0.150 0.753
Health and safety, via representative committee 0.744
03 wood (ds)  21/1/05  10:28 am  Page 39
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
40
TABLE 3. Continued
Rotated Component Matrix
Extent to which employees or their Component
representatives are informed or 
consulted about 1 2 3
Employee benefits, via representative committee 0.674
Pay issues, via representative committee 0.632
Individual dismissals, via representative 
committee –0.154 0.537
Changes to company structure, via direct 
communication 0.832
Major new investments, via direct communication 0.784
Future development of the business, via direct 
communication 0.780
Financial situation of organisation, via direct 
communication 0.749
Collective redundancies, via direct communication 0.732
Employee benefits, via direct representation 0.717
Mergers/acquisitions, via direct communication 0.703
Employment levels in the company, via direct 
communication 0.698
Health and safety, via direct communication 0.671
Transfers of production, via direct communication 0.661
Pay issues, via direct communication 0.636
Cutbacks to/closures of undertakings via direct 
communication 0.595
Improving productivity/competitiveness, via 
direct communication –0.206 0.585
New working methods/via direct communication –0.134 0.568
Individual dismissals, via direct communication 0.526
Notes: Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: varimax
with Kaiser Normalization. Factor weights less than 0.10 not shown. Three-factor
solution explains 56.4% of variance. N = 108.
TABLE 4. Mean Level of Voice by Channel within Each Cluster
Cluster
1 2 3 4 5
Direct Representative Union- Direct/ Multi-
only based representative channel
(n = 33) (n = 22) (n = 4) (n = 34) (n = 11)
Union/staff association 0.14 0.20 1.41 0.11 1.40
Representative committee 0.06 1.37 0.61 1.44 1.04
Direct communication 0.94 0.12 0.00 0.95 0.89
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Correlation Analysis of Channel-specific Voice Levels for Each
Issue in Multiple-channel Systems
The factor analysis suggests that, across the whole sample, levels of voice
through each channel are independent. However, within the hybrid
clusters, do multiple channels reflect an association between channels and
issues or are they used for the same issues? We test this by examining the
two main hybrid clusters. If, within them, the channels are used as substi-
tutes, then we would expect to find employee voice levels via each
channel negatively correlated for particular issues. Alternatively, if
multiple channels are used to reinforce each other, we should expect to
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TABLE 5. Inter-channel Correlations by Issue (within Clusters 4 and 5)
Issue Cluster 4: Cluster 5 (multi-channel)
(direct/ n = 11.
representative) 
n = 35.
Representative Representative Representative Direct
committee committee committee and 
and direct and direct and union union
Financial situation 
of the organization –0.056 0.418 0.463 0.194
Future development 
of the business 0.411* 0.000 0.392 0.000
Changes to company 
structure 0.233 0.770† 0.847** 0.383
Major new investments 0.597** 0.516† 0.671* 0.346
Mergers/acquisitions 0.514** 0.214 –0.113 0.392
Transfers of production 0.082 0.375 0.214 0.570†
Cutbacks to/closures 
of undertaking/
establishments 0.202 0.351 –0.361 0.247
Employment levels in 
the company 0.395* 0.441 0.537† –0.021
Collective redundancies 0.334* 0.748** –0.260 0.191
Individual dismissals 0.499* 0.785** 0.511† 0.200
Pay issues 0.379* –0.077 0.031 0.153
Employee benefits 0.125 0.383 0.148 0.516†
Improving productivity/
competitiveness 0.427 * 0.428 0.428 –0.095
New working methods/
production 
processes/technology 0.416* –0.222 0.295 –0.540†
Health and safety 0.155 0.345 –0.516† 0.325
Notes: † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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find positive correlations. Finally, if there is no systematic link between
channel and issue, we should expect no significant correlation.
Table 5 reports the correlation between the level of voice via each
channel for each issue. Only the correlations between direct voice and
voice via representative committee are reported for the direct/represen-
tative cluster (4), since there is little union voice in this cluster, while the
correlations involving the union channel are also given for the multi-
channel cluster (5). The general pattern is positive, confirming that
multiple channels tend to be used in combination for particular issues,
rather than as substitutes. There are, nonetheless, two significant negative
coefficients for the multi-channel cluster, implying that the union and
representative committee channels may be used as substitutes for each
other on health and safety issues, and that the union and direct channels
are substitutes when dealing with new working methods, production
processes or technology issues. These results suggest that multiple
channels are used in concert rather than that particular issues are associ-
ated with particular channels.
Testing Hypothesis 2: The Trade Union Channel Is Associated
with Voice over Fewer Issues
Returning to Table 2, we can see that in those enterprises where the union
is used as a channel, the mean number of issues on which management
does not involve the workforce through the union channel is 8.3. This
compares unfavourably with the equivalent averages via the representa-
tive or direct channel, which are 2.9 and 3.5 respectively. ANOVA
confirmed that this difference is significant.
Testing Hypothesis 3: Autonomy from Union Influence Is
Associated with Fewer Issues over which Management Involves
Employees and a Lower Level of Voice Regardless of Channel
To test hypothesis 3, we considered the correlation between our measure
of autonomy from the union and the number of issues handled by each
channel at each level of voice. We find that autonomy from union influ-
ence is significantly inversely associated with the number of issues dealt
with via the union and representative committee at all levels, but that this
is not the case for the direct channel (Table 6). Representative voice (i.e.
via unions or representative committee) is lower for higher management
autonomy from unions, in terms of both the number of issues covered
and the level, but direct voice is not.
This could indicate that unions act as a coercive and/or normative
pressure on management to inform and consult via other representative
channels. Alternatively that managements may be using the other
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channels to bypass and undermine the trade union. However, were this
the case we would expect this to cause poor relationships between
management and employee representatives, but reported relationships
between employee representatives and managers3 are no worse where
multiple channels were in use than where the union channel predomi-
nated. It could be that managers who are favourably inclined towards
unions and hence more likely to recognize them and grant them voice
tend also to be positively disposed to other forms of voice. This might be
plausible in a UK-only survey, but in most of our sample, union recog-
nition was not a result of management discretion.
Testing Hypothesis 4: Reliance on Direct-only Methods Is
Associated with Less Overall Voice than with Representative
Channels
Table 7 shows the mean number of issues covered at each level of voice
for each cluster. Direct-only organizations cover fewer issues on average
for each level of voice (information, consultation and joint decision
making/negotiation), while those in the multi-channel cluster involve
employees in the highest number of issues, again at each voice level. An
ANOVA on overall employee voice across the five clusters revealed a
significant difference in overall employee voice (measured as the mean
across all fifteen issues) between groups (F = 8.81, sig = 0.000). Post hoc
tests showed the only significant inter-cluster difference to be signifi-
cantly lower overall employee voice in the direct-only cluster than the
other clusters.
In order to discover which issues accounted for the significant differ-
ence in voice between clusters, we conducted a MANOVA procedure to
compare the level of employee voice on each of the 15 issues across
clusters. The multivariate statistic (Pillai’s trace) showed significant
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TABLE 6. Correlations with Autonomy from Union
Via union Via representative committee Direct
Information –0.44* –0.32* 0.14
Consultation –0.40* –0.29* 0.15 
Negotiation/joint 
decision making –0.34* –0.32* –0.05
Notes: The number of issues dealt with via each channel and at each level of influence
is correlated with trade union influence. 
*p < 0.01
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differences between clusters (F = 1.83, 60 d.f., sig = 0.000). Univariate
tests (post-hoc Bonferonni) revealed significant differences (p < 0.05) for:
changes to company structure; mergers/acquisitions; transfers of produc-
tion; cutbacks to/closures of undertakings/establishments; employment
levels in the company; collective redundancies; pay and benefits. Table 8
shows which clusters had significantly different levels of voice. It demon-
strates that on all the above issues it is the lower level of voice in the
direct-only enterprises that accounts for their lower overall levels of
voice. The only other significant difference with respect to these issues is
that the union-based cluster, like the direct-only cluster, is significantly
lower on employee benefits. On the traditional bargaining issues of pay
and benefits, the multi-channel cluster shows the highest level of voice
(equal with representative-only for benefits). There are no significant
differences between any groups on the other seven issues.
Given that management autonomy from union influence is associated
with lower overall levels of voice, we tested whether the effect of lower
voice in the direct-only cluster was a direct result of the absence of any
union influence. To do this, we conducted a second ANOVA of overall
employee voice on cluster membership, this time entering management
autonomy from the union as a covariate. Management autonomy shows
a significant negative association with overall employee voice and
explains significant variance beyond the effect of cluster membership (F
= 4.21, sig. = 0.043). However, when autonomy from unions was entered,
the cluster continued to explain significant variance (F = 4.69, sig. =
0.004). So the deficiency in the overall level of voice in the direct-only
case is not explained solely by the lack of union influence.
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TABLE 7. Voice Levels by Clustera
Cluster
1 2 3 4 5
Direct Representative Union- Direct/ Multi-
only based representative channel
Information 10.54 12.70 11.50 14.00 14.27
Consultation 3.43 7.13 7.00 6.29 8.00
Joint decision 
making/negotiation 0.60 2.48 2.50 2.06 3.82
Notes: aMean number of issues (of 15) covered at each level of employee involvement
by cluster. N = 104.
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Testing Hypothesis 5: Sole Reliance on Direct Channels Will
Result In Higher Use of High-Commitment Management
Practices
We compared the levels of the three high-commitment factors across
clusters, using analysis of variance. Only the teamworking factor showed
significant variation by cluster (F = 3.04, sig. = 0.21); cluster explains 11
per cent of variance in this factor. However, post hoc tests showed that
teamworking is highest in the multi-channel cluster 5 rather than the
direct-only cluster 1, and significantly greater than in all other clusters
except the representative one. We tested to see if this simply reflected the
fact that teamworking and direct communication were related, regardless
of cluster membership. While they are significantly correlated (F = 0.332,
sig. 0.001), the correlation is not strong, and further analysis showed that
it primarily reflects the disproportionate use of teamworking in the multi-
channel group where direct communication was also prevalent. (None of
the other high-commitment factors is significantly correlated with the use
of the direct voice channel.) Hypothesis 5 is thus not supported.
Conclusion
In this article we have reported research that tests a set of interrelated
hypotheses concerning employee voice. We have confirmed that the voice
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TABLE 8. Differences in Average Voice on Each Issue by Cluster (Post-hoc
Test Results)
Issue Cluster
1 2 3 4 5
Direct Representative Union- Direct/ Multi-
only based representative channel
Changes to company structure >1
Mergers/acquisitions >1
Transfers of production >1
Cutbacks to/closures of 
undertakings/establishments >1 >1
Employment levels in the company >1 >1
Collective redundancies >1
Pay >1
Benefits >1, >3, >4 >3 >1, >3
Notes: Table entries show which clusters have significant differences. 
Issues which do not differ significantly across clusters are not shown.
N = 107.
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channel is significantly associated with the level of voice (hypothesis 1),
so that direct voice typically involves information-sharing, representative
committees entail consultation and trade unions entail negotiation.
However, there are significant divergences from this, for example
management may in some cases negotiate with representative bodies such
as works councils or negotiate directly with employees.
We have also shown through factor analysis that the level of voice for
any issue through a channel can be explained to a large extent by an
overall approach to that channel: if the level of voice through a particu-
lar channel in an establishment is relatively high for one issue it will tend
to be relatively high for other issues through that channel. This suggests
that voice systems are best represented by their differential combinations
of channels that they use and not by differences in how issues are
approached. Further tests showed that when combinations of channels
are used in an enterprise, they are mainly complementary, so that multiple
channels tend to be used for each issue, rather than as substitutes for each
other. We found, through testing hypothesis 2, that the trade union
channel is used for fewer issues than other channels. Nonetheless, there
is some compensation for this, since, as our test of hypothesis 3 showed,
where there is a union influence the overall number of issues dealt with
via both the union and the representative channel is likely to be higher.
Consequently we do not observe significant differences in level of voice
between the multiple-channel clusters. However, as hypothesis 4
predicted, the only prevalent single-channel system in our sample, the
direct-only system, has significantly lower levels of voice than all other
systems. It does not, however, have a greater use of high-commitment
practices, as hypothesis 5 predicted.
If we gauge the results against characterizations of old versus new
(transformed) industrial relations, they seem to reflect more old than
new. The widespread use of direct communication — either alone or in
combination with other channels, may be seen as new — but we have
no benchmark of past levels of direct involvement in our sample firms.
That channels are the key to the ordering principle underlying voice
systems suggests however, that there has not been a fundamental trans-
formation of industrial relations so that issues rather than channels
dominate the determination of the level of voice. The fact that the lack
of union influence affects the overall level of employee voice also
supports this conclusion. It may be true, and this will be tested in
another paper, that when management has autonomy from national
institutions they will take advantage of this and follow direct methods.
But the extent of their autonomy throughout Europe does not appear
to have reached the level where they can pick and choose the level of
voice that they want according to the issue, or largely rely on direct
methods.
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Nonetheless, rather than judge the results simply in ‘old’ and ‘new’
terms, we might conclude that the key results reflect certain potentially
universal principles, the most important of which is that unions constrain
how management can use direct methods, as may other representative
methods that are largely furnished by state support. This study thus
offers further evidence for the argument that institutions matter; the
implication for union policy is that unions can validly claim that their
presence does affect the level of employee voice at work. If the aim is to
extend employee voice beyond the provision of information, then
representative channels should be fostered. This is consistent with the
findings of other studies (e.g. Kessler et al., 2004).
As we have shown that direct voice is not necessarily associated with
high-commitment management, the grounds for unions opposing such
management practices seem weaker. It is precisely because such practices
do not necessarily undermine trade unionism that the partnership
strategy being developed by some British unions has some meaning. It is
an attempt to marry their concerns for more voice and involvement (both
for employees and themselves) with managements’ assumed interest in
high-commitment management. In Kochan and Osterman’s terms, the
mutual gains strategy need not lead to lower levels of employee voice.
But equally, our research suggests that greater voice can only be achieved
if formal representation remains significant.
The study has some limitations that further studies might attempt to
overcome. First, the sample is small (albeit with a rich data set) and hence
may lack the power to detect weaker relationships. Second, the sample is
not random though it may be reasonably representative of large UK-
based multinationals, and we can not be sure that the results can be
generalized. Third, there may be a ‘UK effect’ on the practices used in
subsidiaries, and in particular our sample may overestimate the extent of
direct methods; though it is claimed that they are increasingly used else-
where (e.g. for Germany see Weitbrecht, 2003). Allowing for such differ-
ences is not, however, likely to invalidate our main conclusions since the
point of the cross-national study was to extend the range of practice that
could be observed. Nonetheless, we need similar studies in non-UK
multinationals to see if there is an ownership effect. Fourth, our study is
cross-sectional, and longitudinal studies of the evolution of employee
voice systems may provide enhanced understanding of the link between
the various types of voice.
Finally, the study has implications for the subject of industrial
relations. It reinforces the need to centre industrial relations on the inter-
relationship between voice mechanisms, and to avoid defining systems of
industrial or employment relations in terms of single channels. For
example, it is the exclusive reliance on direct voice at the expense of
representative involvement, rather than direct involvement per se, that is
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associated with reduced levels of employee voice. The small number of
cases in our sample in the union-only cluster does question any pure defi-
nition of industrial relations that is rooted in trade unionism. Nonethe-
less, the more frequent hybrids are not necessarily selected by
management (alone or in combination with employees or their represen-
tatives) as totalities. Rather, it is likely that they evolve through time as a
variety of influences act on the use of channels. For example, in one of
the firms studied, the UK operations were characterized by a long history
of collaborative industrial relations conducted through both union and
representative committee channels. Interviews with managers and
employee representatives revealed that the current arrangements had
built up over the 150-year history of the company. Employment relations
were founded to a large extent on the nature of the original manufactur-
ing technology, which imposed very high costs for interruptions to the
production process. The technology changed, but much of the collabora-
tive approach to industrial relations remained embedded in the practices
of the organization. Direct communications were being grafted on this
longstanding system.
The lack of an association between voice and high-commitment
management could, on the one hand, be used to justify a separation
between the subject of industrial relations, with its focus on represen-
tation, and human resource management with its focus on personnel
practices. On the other hand, since the research shows that neither direct
voice nor high-commitment management are necessarily antithetical to
unions or strong works councils, there is no case for abandoning the
study of collective industrial relations. We suggest that we should not
declare the end of industrial relations, but should rather foster an inte-
grated employment relations research and policy agenda (Wood, 2000).
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NOTES
1 At the time of writing the UK was in the process of transposing the EU
Framework Directive on Information and Consultation. While this may
bring about some convergence, it will impose significantly weaker
constraints on UK firms than exist in most other countries.
2 A two-stage cluster analysis was conducted (Punj and Stewart, 1983). First,
initial clusters were identified using Ward’s minimum variance method. We
created a chart of the distance at which successive clusters combined, and, by
examining it for step increases in the distance, we were able to determine the
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cut-off point for the number of clusters. Five clusters were thus identified.
Second, the centroid of each cluster was calculated in order to seed a 
k-means, partitioning cluster analysis. K-means clustering starts with a fixed
number of (k) clusters and specified centres to those clusters. Cases are then
allocated to the cluster with the nearest centre. The cluster centre is
recalculated as each case is added. The advantage of this process is that such 
non-hierarchical methods produce more stable clusters and fewer results that
are artefacts of the analysis procedure. However, the first hierarchical stage is
needed to provide cluster centres for the non-hierarchical procedure. We
tested the stability of the five-cluster solution, as McIntyre and Blashfield
(1980) suggest, by splitting the sample into two equal halves. The cluster
analysis was repeated on the first sub-sample. We then classified the second
sub-sample in two ways: first, according to the proximity of each case to the
cluster centroids from the first sub-sample cluster analysis; and second, by
carrying out an independent cluster analysis on the second sub-sample. The
two classifications of the second sub-sample were compared by 
cross-tabulation and a measure of inter-rater reliability (kappa) was calculated
and as a high level of agreement was found the cluster solution was gauged to
be stable. The results of this test are available from the authors. Four outliers
were identified and removed by examining scatter plots of all cases on the
three factors prior to carrying out the cluster analysis.
3 Managers were asked to report the quality of relationships with employee
representatives on a five-point scale from ‘highly adversarial’ to ‘highly 
co-operative’.
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